








Natural properties and bottomless determination 

It is widely held that some properties are more natural than others and that, as David Lewis put it, “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). The general line of thought is that such ‘elitism’ about properties is justified as it can give simple and elegant solutions to a number of old metaphysical and philosophical problems. My aim is to analyze what these natural properties are: super-determinates or determinable (or maybe both) and argue that all three of these options would lead to serious difficulties for metaphysical elitism and would prevent natural properties from fulfilling their supposed grand explanatory role. 

I.	What are natural properties?  

The concept of natural properties has played a very important role in contemporary metaphysics. This concept was introduced by David Lewis, who made a distinction between natural and unnatural properties and claimed that this distinction is an objective one: “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347, see also Lewis 1984, 1986). Natural properties are “an élite minority of special properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 346) among the plebs of abundant properties. Every predicate, regardless of how disjunctive or gerrymandered it is, expresses an abundant property. Abundant properties, as Lewis puts it, “carve reality at the joints – and everywhere else as well. If it’s distinctions we want, too much structure is no better than none” (Lewis 1983, p. 346). So we need some other, more restricted, concept of properties, which he calls natural (or sparse) properties. Natural properties are the properties “whose sharing makes for resemblance” and also the ones with “relevant causal powers” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). 
	Naturalness comes in degrees. Some really elite properties are perfectly natural. Some others are a bit less natural, whereas the vast majority are simply unnatural. Being metallic is one example he gives for a natural but not perfectly natural property. He does not give many examples for perfectly natural properties, but the ones he gives are “the charges and masses of particles, also their so-called ‘spins’, ‘colours’ and ‘flavours’” (Lewis 1986, p. 60, see also Lewis 1984, p. 228 for a similar list). 
	Some clarifications are in order. First of all, the distinction between natural and unnatural properties is one between different property-types (as opposed to property-instances or tropes). Second, this distinction is orthogonal to the nominalism/realism debate about properties. Lewis explicitly talks about two different ways of drawing this distinction between natural and unnatural properties, a nominalist and a realist one. So regardless of which picture we are drawn to, according to Lewis, we need to make a distinction between natural and unnatural universals (if we have realist leanings) or between natural and unnatural resemblance classes (if we have nominalist leanings). 
	Further clarifications: Natural properties are supposed to be discovered by our best scientific theories: it is science that is supposed to tell us which property-types are natural and which ones are unnatural. At the same time, the natural/unnatural distinction is the same across possible worlds. As Lewis says, “a property is natural or unnatural simpliciter, not relative to one or another possible world” (Lewis 1986, p. 61, n. 44).​[1]​ 
	There has been a lot of discussion about what natural properties are really supposed to be. For example, are they are drawn from all levels of nature or only from the fundamental level (if there is such a thing)? Jonathan Schaffer examined the various roles natural properties are supposed to play in metaphysics and on the basis of this concludes that they are drawn from all levels (Schaffer 2004). 
	I want to ask a different question about what natural properties are supposed to be: whether they are determinable or determinate properties. But I’ll aim to answer this question with the help of the same methodology Schaffer uses: by examining whether determinate or determinable properties can fulfil the various roles natural properties are supposed to play in metaphysics. 

II.	Are perfectly natural properties super-determinates?

Being red is a determinate of being colored, but a determinable of being scarlet. The determinable-determinate relation is an asymmetric and transitive relation between property-types. There are many ways of being red and being scarlet is one of these: for something to be scarlet is for it to be red, in a specific way. If something is red, it also has to be of a certain specific shade of red: there is no such thing as being red simpliciter (Johnston 1921, Funkhouser 2006). 
The determinable-determinate relation is a relative one: the same property, for example, of being red, can be the determinate of the determinable being colored, but the determinable of the determinate being scarlet. Thus, the determinable-determinate relation gives us hierarchical ordering of property-types in a given property-space. Property-types with no further determinates, if there are any, are known as super-determinates. 
Question: are perfectly natural properties determinables or super-determinates? Or maybe they can be either? In order to answer this question, we need to examine what role natural properties are supposed to play in metaphysics. Lewis justified his appeal to natural properties by enumerating a number of different roles natural properties should or already do play in metaphysics:​[2]​ 

(1)	Natural properties are the properties “whose sharing makes for resemblance” (Lewis 1983, p. 347).
(2)	Duplication and intrinsicality can only be explained with the help of the sharing of perfectly natural properties. 
(3)	A consistent statement of materialism presupposes perfectly natural properties. 
(4)	“Fundamental laws […] must concern perfectly natural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 368). 
(5)	Natural properties are the properties with “relevant causal powers” (Lewis 1983, p. 347).
(6)	Natural properties help us to solve Putnam’s Paradox.  
(7)	Perfectly natural properties “characterize things completely and without redundancy” (Lewis 1986, p. 60).  

Thus, we have seven desiderata that a conception of natural property needs to satisfy. Philosophers who analyze natural properties tend to pick and choose a subset of these seven desiderata. Schaffer discusses only (1), (5) and (7) (Schaffer 2004, pp. 94-95), Taylor talks only about (2), (4) and (6) (Taylor 1993, pp. 82-83). Hawthorne mentions (1), (2), (3) and (5) (Hawthorne 2006, pp. 235-237 - and (6) elsewhere, see Hawthorne 2007). I will examine them all. 
An important thing to note about these seven desiderata is that some of them ((2), (3), (4), (7)) are about perfectly natural properties and some others ((1), (5), (6)) are about natural (but not necessarily perfectly natural) properties. Lewis pointed out that the postulation of perfectly natural properties is independent from the postulation of the difference in degree of naturalness among properties (see, e.g., Lewis 1983, p. 347). My strategy will be to focus on perfectly natural properties first and then examine the possibility of holding onto the naturalness scale without postulating perfectly natural properties. 
In the light of this, the question is: are perfectly natural properties super-determinates or determinables?​[3]​ Some of Lewis’s remarks and examples seem to suggest that they must be super-determinates. When he introduces natural properties in Lewis 1986, one of the six attributes he has for them is that “they are highly specific” (Lewis 1986, p. 60). It is difficult to see what is supposed to be meant by this if not a high degree of determinacy. 
And many of the desiderata also reinforce this answer. Take duplication (desideratum (2)) first. Lewis claims that “two things are qualitative duplicates if they have exactly the same perfectly natural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 356). This account makes sense only if perfectly natural properties are super-determinates. If perfectly natural properties were determinable, nothing would prevent exact duplicates from differing in their super-determinate properties, but then they would hardly count as exact duplicates (see also Hawthorne 2006, p. 235). In short, desideratum (2) implies that perfectly natural properties are super-determinates.​[4]​ And as the concept duplication is put to various uses in Lewisian metaphysics (supervenience, diverging worlds, defining materialism), this is an especially important desideratum. 
Desideratum (7) also points in the same direction. One important feature of perfectly natural properties is that they “characterize things completely and without redundancy” (Lewis 1986, p. 60). But if they are determinables, then they could not characterize things completely, as then they would leave the super-determinates uncharacterized. Desideratum (7) also seems to imply that perfectly natural properties are super-determinates. 
	Desideratum (5) is much less straightforward in this respect. Again, perfectly natural properties are the ones with “relevant causal powers” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). So the question becomes: can determinable properties be causally relevant? And here we have no consensus. It has been argued that they can (see esp. Yablo 1992), but there are some forceful arguments in support of the claim that only super-determinates can have causal powers (see especially Gillet-Rives 2005 and Crane 2008 for a very thorough overview of the plausibility of both views). If we go along with what Crane 2008 takes to be the less problematic position and accept that only super-determinates have causal powers, then desideratum (5) also implies that perfectly natural properties are super-determinates. 
	So much about the pro-super-determinate considerations. Some of the desiderata seem to go against the interpretation of perfectly natural properties as super-determinates. The most important case in point is desideratum (3). Lewis uses perfectly natural properties to delineate a set of possible worlds, which he calls ‘the inner sphere’: Worlds in the ‘inner sphere’ are ‘just like ours’ (Lewis 1986, p. x): they do not instantiate any perfectly natural properties that are absent from our world. Then worlds in the ‘inner sphere’ are used to define materialism. As Lewis says, “among worlds [in the ‘inner sphere’], no two differ without differing physically” (Lewis 1983, p. 364). It may seem that this use for perfectly natural properties go against the interpretation of perfectly natural properties as super-determinates. Here is John Hawthorne: 

Suppose that there is some determinate mass value that is uninstantiated in the actual world: no fusion of objects has exactly mass n. Surely we should not conclude that a world where some fusion of objects has that value thereby falls outside the inner sphere. When thinking of alien intrusions, Lewis has determinables, not determinates in mind. (Hawthorne 2006, p. 235, see also Dorr and Hawthorne 2013.) 

So desideratum (3) seems to suggest that perfectly natural properties are determinable. But the problem with this desideratum is that this seems to be the least relevant for contemporary metaphysics. The vast majority of statements of materialism in the last twenty years did not appeal to natural properties (some representative examples: Marras 1993, Pereboom 2002 and especially Kim 1984, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2005 and Wilson 2005). There have been and are various debates and disagreements about how to, and how not to, formulate materialism and what version of it is most plausible, but the distinction between natural and unnatural properties have not been alluded to in these debates (again, some representative examples: Crane and Mellor 1990, Rosenberg 2005, Wedgwood 2000, Pereboom and Kornblith 1991).
Now take desideratum (4): “Fundamental laws [of nature] must concern perfectly natural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 368). But are laws of nature about super-determinate property-types? Clearly not the ones we are familiar with. Newton’s law of gravity is not about super-determinate mass properties (see Hawthorne 2006, p. 236, Dorr and Hawthorne 2013 and Weatherson 2005 for a good summary; see also Denby 2001, p. 300). This is true. But it is important to note that Lewis’s claim is not that the laws of nature we are familiar with from the history of science “must concern perfectly natural properties”, but that “fundamental laws” must do so. So Lewis could rule out all considerations from the analysis of Newton’s law of gravity as irrelevant as they do not concern ‘fundamental laws’. 
I do not want to spend too much time on desideratum (4), as it has been argued that this use of perfectly natural properties is problematic, regardless of whether we interpret them to be super-determinates or determinables. A scientific theory that gives us laws in terms of unnatural properties may be better at making predictions and giving explanations than any scientific theory that give us laws in terms of perfectly natural properties (see Van Fraassen 1989, pp. 40-59 and Elgin 1995 for two influential criticisms). And it is not clear that taking perfectly natural properties to be determinables is a better bet for saving desideratum (4) from these objections than taking them to be super-determinates (see Hawthorne 2006, pp. 236-237, who makes the same point). 
	What is left? Desideratum (6): a possible solution to Putnam’s Paradox. Putnam’s paradox states that there are no constraints on the way language and thought is to be consistently interpreted. Lewis counters this by insisting that there is such a constraint: it is just that this constraint is not part of the interpretative process but of what is being interpreted. Only some potential interpretations give us eligible reference: the ones that pick out natural properties. The majority of potential interpretations give us ineligible reference as they pick out unnatural properties. As Lewis summarizes, “eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 371, see Williams 2007, Hawthorne 2007, Van Fraassen 1997, Elgin 1995 for further analysis). 
	Note that this use of the natural/unnatural distinction does not presuppose the existence of perfectly natural properties: Lewis does not claim that only perfectly natural properties could be candidates for referents. Hence, desideratum (6) is unlikely to shed any light on whether perfectly natural properties are to be considered super-determinates. 
	It seems then that if we want to interpret Lewis charitably, we should conclude that he considered perfectly natural properties to be super-determinates. I will take this interpretation of perfectly natural properties for granted in what follows, so, in order not to beg any questions, I will briefly consider whether I’m not too charitable or whether my interpretation of perfectly natural properties is in fact be the most charitable one. 
	As my ultimate aim is to argue that it is not true that “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347), my strategy here is to give an interpretation of the ‘objective difference between natural and unnatural properties’ that is as plausible as possible. It has been argued that the different desiderata on natural properties are pulling in different directions: some of them presuppose that perfectly natural properties are super-determinates, whereas some others presuppose that they are determinables (Hawthorne 2006 is toying with this idea, but see Dorr and Hawthorne 2013 and Eddon 2013). 
But then the question becomes: how many naturalness scales do we have? If each of the desiderata picks out one, then we already have seven. And if we add further metaphysical problems the natural/unnatural distinction needs to address, the list can grow indefinitely. But, to paraphrase Lewis, too many naturalness scales are no better than none. Thus, if there were different naturalness scales (picked out by different desiderata), this would cast serious doubts on the claim that the difference between natural and unnatural properties is an objective one. So my strategy was to assume that we can give a coherent interpretation to Lewis’s use of perfectly natural properties that is consistent with there being an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties. If this assumption is incorrect, then the negative part of my argument could be considered to be completed. 
	So I’m assuming that there is only one naturalness scale. This still leaves open three options: (a) perfectly natural properties are determinables, (b) perfectly natural properties are (or can be) both super-determinates and determinables and (c) perfectly natural properties are super-determinates. 
	I argued that no desideratum rules out (c). But maybe (a) or (b) could fare equally well. I don’t think so. We have seen that if perfectly natural properties are determinables, then they are useless for giving an account of duplication: as in this case nothing would prevent exact duplicates from differing in their super-determinate properties, but then they would not count as exact duplicates. As the duplication desideratum (desideratum (2)) is what makes supervenience and the definition of intrinsicality possible, which are some of the most important concepts in Lewisian metaphysics, if an interpretation of perfectly natural properties does not satisfy this desideratum, it could hardly be considered to be consistent with Lewis’s metaphysical framework. So determinables are out. 
	But how about (b): the suggestion that perfectly natural properties are (or can be) both super-determinates and determinables? The problem here is desideratum (7): Lewis’s claim that perfectly natural properties “characterize things completely and without redundancy” (Lewis 1986, p. 60). If we allowed both determinables and super-determinates in the elite club of perfectly natural properties, then they would characterize the world with a very high degree of redundancy indeed. If the super-determinate P is a perfectly natural property, then adding a determinable, P*, of P among perfectly natural properties would make the characterization of the world redundant. 




I argued that perfectly natural properties are super-determinates. And now I would like to raise a very simple problem for account that relies on the concept of perfectly natural properties: what if there are no super-determinates? 
So far, I have been assuming that there are such things as super-determinate property-types: property-types with no further determinates. This is an assumption that many would be happy to make. Johnston, for example, who introduced the determinable-determinate relation, takes the existence of super-determinates a “universally adopted postulate” (Johnson 1921, p. 185), and many agreed with him (see, for example, Armstrong 1961). But should we postulate the existence of such property-types? Why should we assume that there are property-types that have no further determinates? Wouldn’t it be possible that every determinate has further determinates? It has been argued that what Johnson called a “universally adopted postulate” is in fact false (see, for example, Sanford 1970, 2006, see also Sorensen 2011 for analysis). My strategy is the following: first, I argue that we may have reasons to think that the actual world is a world with bottomless determination. Second, I point out that even if the actual world does have super-determinates, all we need for our argument against the objective natural/unnatural distinction is that some (maybe very distant) possible worlds are bottomless determination worlds. And this seems difficult to deny – even if one can resist the claim about the actual world .
First, the actual world. Here is a reason why one might think that even the actual world lacks super-determinates (at least for some properties). Take Benoit Mandelbrot’s famous observation about measuring the coastline of Britain, which kicked off (or, rather, lifted into respectable journals) the research on fractals (Mandelbrot 1967, see also Richardson 1961). Mandelbrot pointed out that the length of the coastline of Britain depends on the scale we use to measure it. We get different results if we use 100 meter long rulers (in such a way that both ends of the rulers must touch the coastline), 1 meter long rulers, 1 centimetre long rulers, and so on. Now, not all national or state boundaries are of this kind: regardless of how we measure the length of the boundaries of the state of Utah, we get the same results. But the boundaries of some entities are not so smooth, Britain being a possible example. If we consider entities of this kind, that is, entities whose fractal dimension is higher than 1, the length of the boundaries (or surface, or volume) of these objects has no super-determinate value.
Potential objection: couldn’t we use the limits of these measurement as the super-determinate value of the length of, say, the coast of Britain? Suppose that we have an (infinite) series of measurement of the length of an entity and these measurements give us the following value (from coarser to finer): N; 2N - N/2; 2N – N/4; 2N – N/8, etc. Couldn’t we just take the limits of these values (which would be 2N) and take that to be the super-determinate length of the entity? We can in some cases, but we cannot in others. In the case of the length of the boundary of the Mandelbrot set (and even, arguably, in the case of the length of the coastline of Britain, see Richardson 1961), the limit is not a finite value. Some objects in our actual world seems to have (much) higher fractal dimension than 1: potential candidates include such banal objects as broccoli, fern-leaves, frost-crystals and Britain herself. The length of the boundaries (surface, etc) of these entities in the actual world is not a super-determinate. 
This argument about the actual world is not supposed to be conclusive – its aim is to show that it may not be such a crazy idea to argue that the actual world is a bottomless determination world. But we do not need to make this assumption in order to argue against the objective difference between natural and unnatural properties. It is enough if we allow that there are some bottomless determination possible worlds: possible worlds where the same properties exist as in the actual world, but where there are no super-determinates. In these worlds, as there are no super-determinates and as perfectly natural properties are super-determinates, there are no perfectly natural properties either. But as “a property is natural or unnatural simpliciter, not relative to one or another possible world” (Lewis 1986, p. 61, n. 44), this means that there are no perfectly natural properties simpliciter. We are done. To use mass as an example for a perfectly natural property (Lewis’s own example – Lewis 1986, p. 60), if there is a bottomless determination possible world, that is a possible world where there are no super-determinates, but there is mass in this possible world, then mass is not a perfectly natural property in this possible world. But then it is not a perfectly natural property in any possible world (including the actual one) either. 
It is important not to confuse my objection with the (not particularly good or original) objection that there are some distant (maybe even empty) possible worlds where there are no such properties as masses. In these worlds, if there are no mass properties, one candidate Lewis gives for a perfectly natural property is missing. This constitutes no objection whatsoever to the idea of natural properties. Lewis fully acknowledges that there are possible worlds where the natural properties are different from those in the actual world – as we have seen in the discussion of the ‘inner sphere’ of worlds (Lewis 1986, p. x, Lewis 1983, p. 364). If we find a world where there are no mass properties, this in no way influences whether the naturalness of mass properties is relative to one or another possible world where they do exist. My argument is about a possible world, call it W*, where there are mass properties.​[5]​ In other words, W* may well be in the ‘inner sphere’: it instantiates a property that is perfectly natural in the actual world: mass. But if we put this claim together with Lewis’s dictum that “a property is natural or unnatural simpliciter, not relative to one or another possible world” (Lewis 1986, p. 61, n. 44), then some mass properties would need to be perfectly natural in W*. But there are no perfectly natural weight properties in W*: there are no super-determinates in W* and perfectly natural properties need to be super-determinates. We have reached a contradiction. 
How could the proponent of the objective distinction between natural and unnatural properties respond to this argument? She could deny that perfectly natural properties are super-determinates. But as I argued at length in the previous section, this option is not too promising. She could also break with Lewis and deny that “a property is natural or unnatural simpliciter, not relative to one or another possible world” (Lewis 1986, p. 61, n. 44). But unless we assume that the natural/unnatural distinction holds across possible worlds, few (if any) of the desiderata I examined in the last section will be satisfied: (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) all presuppose comparisons of natural properties across worlds. 
Finally, the proponent of the objective distinction between natural and unnatural properties could deny that there are some possible worlds where there are no super-determinates. Maybe she could follow the same strategy as the one Lewis in fact followed in responding to an argument of similar structure: Jonathan Schaffer’s argument about fundamental properties (Schaffer 2004). Schaffer argued that perfectly natural properties should not be taken to be fundamental. For in worlds with no fundamental level, it is unclear what they could possibly be. Lewis, in personal communication with Schaffer, responded that these worlds are “too far-fetched to take too seriously: ’If an otherwise good approach to sparse properties must treat that far-fetched possibility as an exception, so be it’” (quoted in Schaffer 2004, p. 97). On the analogy of this answer, the proponent of the objective distinction between natural and unnatural properties could say that the possibility of there being no super-determinates is too far-fetched to be taken seriously. But what is far-fetched about this possibility? A world where all properties are the way the length of the coastline in the actual world (a fractal-world) is no more ‘far-fetched’ than a world without fundamental properties – it may even be less far-fetched. Importantly, all that is needed for my argument (and also for Schaffer’s argument) is that a world of this kind is a possible world (however far away from the actual world) and this seems to be an unproblematic assumption. 
So all three premises of my argument seem difficult to question: Perfectly natural properties are super-determinates, there are possible worlds with no super-determinates (but where there are the same properties as in the actual world) and “a property is natural or unnatural simpliciter, not relative to one or another possible world” (Lewis 1986, p. 61, n. 44). But then the conclusion seems to follow: there are no perfectly natural properties. 
The proponent of the objective distinction between natural and unnatural properties can, at this point, just abandon perfectly natural properties while holding onto the natural/unnatural distinction itself. But it seems that this distinction will do very little metaphysical work without the postulation of perfectly natural properties. 
	More slowly: the suggestion would be the following: As we have seen, naturalness comes in degrees. Some properties are more natural then others. And if we encounter a problem with regards to perfectly natural properties, maybe we should just give up on them while still allowing that there is an objective distinction between more natural and less natural properties.​[6]​ 
	I do not think that this strategy would be a successful one. Some of the most important uses for the natural/unnatural distinction only work if we also postulate perfectly natural properties. Duplication is a clear example. If we allow for an objective distinction between more natural and less natural properties but deny that there are perfectly natural properties, that would not help us in defining exact duplication (and, as a result, supervenience, intrinsicality and materialism): even if two objects share all their highly natural properties, it is still possible that they differ in terms of some even more highly natural properties, in which case, we can hardly talk about exact duplication. 
Further, if naturalness comes in degrees but there are no perfectly natural properties, then it is not clear how we could talk about the laws of nature and causation. Lewis’s original idea was that laws of nature connect perfectly natural properties. But if there are no perfectly natural properties, only more natural and less natural properties, then some claims will count as more lawful laws of nature and others as less so? Few metaphysical realists would accept this picture and the claim that laws of nature come in degrees. The same argument applies to Lewis’s claim that natural properties are the one with relevant causal powers. There are only more and less natural properties but no perfectly natural properties, then it seems that causal relevance also comes in degrees. Again, few metaphysical realist would be happy with this conclusion.​[7]​ To sum up, if we have to dispose of perfectly natural property, we also need to dispose of the concept of natural properties altogether.​[8]​ 




But what happens if we dispose of the natural/unnatural distinction? Would all properties be equal? Wouldn’t this amount to some kind of idealism? The hope is that a metaphysical picture that does not presuppose an objective distinction between natural and unnatural properties is not at all crazy. And given that the concept of natural properties does not seem viable, we should explore the possibilities of an egalitarian metaphysics. My aim here is not to give a plausible sketch of egalitarian metaphysics or to argue that the theoretical work that Lewis’s natural/unnatural distinction was supposed to do can be done in such a framework (but see Nanay 2011, 2013). All I aim to show is that egalitarianism is our only option. But is it? 
	We have seen that the concept of natural properties seems to be problematic. But does rejecting the Lewisian concept of natural properties land us in egalitarianism? Couldn’t we preserve some kind of privilege for the elite? My answer is that there is no middle way. If the objective natural/unnatural distinction has to go, our only option is egalitarianism. 
One option that needs to be considered is what Lewis calls ‘vegetarian metaphysics’: the view that “natural properties are those that play some interesting special role in our thinking” (Langton and Lewis 1998, pp. 119-120, see also Lewis 2001, p. 382, n. 5). Lewis considers the account of natural properties this ‘vegetarian’ metaphysics would give us to be as viable at least for some explanatory tasks (more precisely, for the definition of ‘intrinsic’) as any other. This may or may not be true (see Sider 2001, esp. p. 362 for some reservations). But what is important from the point of view of my argument is that what such ‘vegetarian metaphysics’ would amount to is in fact a fairly radical view that would not be acceptable for Lewisian metaphysics in general. 
What Lewis labels as ‘vegetarian metaphysics’ is really Barry Taylor’s view (see esp. Taylor 1993, who replaces talk of natural properties with the concept of ‘T-cosy properties’, see esp. Taylor 1993, p. 90, see also Taylor 2004), according to which the natural/unnatural distinction only makes sense if we interpret it as something that plays a “central and fundamental classificatory role” (Lewis 2001, p. 382, n. 5). But what does it mean that a property (or rather the predicate that expresses this property) plays a ’central and fundamental classificatory role’? Taylor distinguishes two such proposals. According to the first, natural properties are always relative to a theory: natural properties are the ones that play ‘the central and fundamental classificatory role’ in this theory. According to the second, natural properties are the ones that play ‘the central and fundamental classificatory role’ in our common sense conception of the world (or in some reasonable formalization thereof). 
These two ways of cashing out vegetarian metaphysics may differ in terms of the help they may or may not provide to Lewis’s account of defining ‘intrinsic’ (the former seems to have the edge, see Sider 2001, Lewis 2001, p. 382), but what matters for our purposes is that regardless of which version we choose, the end result is unacceptable for Lewis (he comes close to saying this much in the last sentence of footnote 5 of Lewis 2001, p. 382). Remember the Lewisian dictum: “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). Vegetarian metaphysics is not an adequate theory of properties in this Lewisian sense. The difference between natural and unnatural properties, according to the vegetarian, is not a difference that exists independently of our conceptualization of the world. In other words, the difference between natural and unnatural properties is not a metaphysical difference, but an epistemic (or pragmatic or even a psychological) one. But Lewis’s whole point of breaking with his old theory of properties in the early 1980s and introducing the natural/unnatural distinction was to claim that this difference is an objective, mind-independent, metaphysical difference (that even holds across possible worlds). Turning vegetarian does not save the (metaphysical) natural/unnatural distinction; it makes this distinction disappear. 
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^1	  I put aside the question about whether and under what condition does the distinction between natural and unnatural properties imply essentialism, something Lewis would definitely not like. See Buras 2006. 
^2	  I’m following a similar strategy here as Hawthorne 2006, pp. 235-236. 
^3	  The literature is divided on this question. Denby 2001 assumes that perfectly natural properties are all determinables. Crane 2008 assumes that they are all super-determinates. Hawthorne 2006 and Dorr and Hawthorne argue that neither response is unproblematic.
^4	  Desideratum (2) could also be satisfied if perfectly natural properties could be both super-determinates and determinable. But this way of resolving the problem (see Hawthorne 2006) is problematic for some of the other desiderata, as I argue at the very end of this section. 
^5	  Some may find the emphasis on mass problematic: one could deny that mass is a perfectly natural property and nonetheless stay within the Lewisian framework – Lewis himself is rather tentative about mass as an example for being a perfectly natural property. But we can run an analogous argument for any property, P, that is perfectly natural in the actual world: take a possible world W*, where P is instantiated, but where there are no perfectly natural properties and use that world in the rest of the argument. 
^6	  Hawthorne 2006, p. 235, n. 24 seems to suggest that this is Hawthorne’s preferred option, see also Dorr and Hawthorne 2013. 
^7	  A further related problem is the following. What are natural but not perfectly natural properties? Lewis suggests a way of identifying them, in terms of the ‘chain of definability’: natural but not perfectly natural properties “can be reached by not-too-complicated chains of definability from the perfectly natural properties” (Lewis 1986, p. 61, see also Lewis 1984, p. 228). There are many reasons to think that this ‘chain of definability’ method does not work. See especially Sider 1995’s thorough analysis as well as Hawthorne 2006 and Sider 1996. 
^8	  There may be a way of rephrasing (1) - (7) in a way that would replace the appeal to perfectly natural properties with reference to more and less natural properties only. One way of doing this would be to use an infinite series of more and more natural properties. To take (2) as an example,  two worlds are duplicates if in an infinite series of ever higher degree of naturalness of properties we use to compare them, there is no difference between them. This way of proceeding may or may not work, but even if it does, it will be giving up too much of the original Lewisian project. 
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